

# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

25 November 1975

*Memo For* Secretary Rumsfeld

Attached is a memorandum for you to give Scowcroft on the NSC Staff reorganization issue. It follows from the memo Scowcroft sent you at Tab A and the President's comments at Tab B. Tom and I agree with the attached memo.

This has not been coordinated with anyone in the Building although I believe General Brown and Mr. Clements would basically support it. However, you may wish to discuss this briefly with Mr. Clements in the interest of sharing thoughts.



JAW

Attachments  
As stated



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR General Scowcroft

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NSC Staff

The NSC Staff traditionally has been used in one of two fashions. The first is that of a coordinating mechanism. The NSC Staff's main function, under this option, would be to make certain that the other components of the National Security Council system meet deadlines, that the options they present to the President are spelled out clearly, that all shades of opinion are accurately represented, and that the President's choices are spelled out in such a fashion as to assist him in making the proper judgments. The second option in using the NSC Staff would be to add the formulation of policy to the functions in option one. Mr. Kissinger, for example, used the NSC Staff, not only to reflect the views and policy options presented by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, etc., but also to develop and formulate Mr. Kissinger's own policy recommendations.

In sum, the President needs to decide whether he wants you to serve primarily as a staff officer, assuring that the policy options presented by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and others are fully and accurately presented to the President or whether over and above that he wishes you to be an active participant and advocate in the formulation of policy. Obviously there can develop somewhat of a conflict if you find yourself playing both a role as a policy formulator and advocate and as the honest broker of the various opinions of the Cabinet officers.

Regardless of which of the above options the President chooses, the NSC Staff structure, as presently organized, needs considerable alteration. For example, there is no need for a Defense Program Review Committee. If the Secretary of Defense is doing his job properly and coordinating with the Secretary of State as required by law, there is no need for the NSC Staff to attempt to review Defense programs. Moreover, the process of budget review, NSC meetings, and other meetings with the President provide a basis for review of security policy and programs. As you know, the Defense Program Review Committee has not met in years and never worked well from the beginning. In addition, the NSCIC and the Forty Committee could be merged. Their membership is virtually identical and there is no reason why they cannot serve both functions. Also, the Under Secretaries Committee and the Senior



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MEMORANDUM FOR General Secord

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NSC Staff

The NSC Staff traditionally has been used in one of two fashions. The first is that of a coordinating mechanism. The NSC Staff's main function, under this option, would be to make certain that the various components of the National Security Council system were coordinated and that the options they present to the President are spelled out clearly. That all shades of opinion are accurately represented, and that the President's choices are spelled out in such a fashion as to assist him in making the proper judgment. The second option is that the NSC Staff would be to aid the formulation of policy to the President in one way. Mr. Kissinger, for example, used the NSC Staff not only to reflect the views and policy options presented by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, etc., but also to develop and formulate Mr. Kissinger's own policy recommendations.

In sum, the President needs to decide whether he wants you to serve primarily as a staff officer, assisting that the policy options are spelled out by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and others in a fully and accurately presented to the President or whether you and those that he wishes you to be an active participant and advocate in the formulation of policy. Obviously there can develop somewhat of a conflict if you find yourself playing both a role as a policy formulator and advocate and as the honest broker of the various opinions of the Cabinet officers.

Regardless of which of the above options the President chooses, the NSC Staff structure as presently organized needs considerable attention. For example, there is no need for a Defense Program Review Committee. If the Secretary of Defense is doing his job properly and coordinating with the Secretary of State as required by law, there is no need for the NSC Staff to attempt to review defense programs. The process of budget review, NSC meetings, and other meetings with the President provide a basis for review of security policy programs. As you know, the Defense Program Review Committee has not met in years and never worked well from the beginning. In addition, the NSC and the Policy Committee could be merged. Their membership is virtually identical and there is no reason why they should serve two functions. Also, the Labor Secretaries Committee and the



*Lead - mbr*

Review Group should probably be merged. There is only a slight degree of difference in the character of the subjects which they address. The Verification Panel and Washington Special Actions Group could continue because of the unique functions they perform. It has been tradition that Assistant Secretaries of State chair the various interdepartmental group subcommittees. Judging from the President's reaction to the memo you gave him, we might consider allowing other departments to chair pertinent IG committees such as the Politico-Military Interdepartmental Group, or to chair Verification Panel Working Groups. Finally, regarding the Verification Panel, that is the primary functioning subcommittee of the NSC. It plays a vital part in our SALT negotiations and probably should be left pretty much alone. In summary I would suggest the following changes:

*President's opinion*

Current	<del>Chairman</del>	Proposed	Chairman
SRG	NSC	SRG	NSC <del>State</del>
USC	NSC		
NSCIC	NSC	40 Cmte	NSC
40 Cmte	NSC		
WSAG	NSC	WSAG	NSC <del>at DoD</del> most active
VP	NSC	VP	State while (H.) at State
VP WG	NSC		? <del>DoD or ACDA</del>
DPRC	NSC	None	None - if keep - DoD -
6 Geog.	IG State	→	State <del>Academy</del> <del>care</del>
Pol. Mil.	IG	→	DoD (ISA) or State

*6p. step*

*USC if not merged - State*

*merged or not merged*

*WAG State*

*Sub review Strategy Keep DoD DP chair*

*Bill + GB OK*

*KI " OK*

*OK*

